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The Definition of Political Corruption 
Mark Philp 
22/10/12 
 
 
I 
To conclude. The Light of humane minds is Perspicuous Words, but by exact definitions first 
snuffed,  and purged from ambiguity; Reason is the pace; Encrease of Science, the way; and 
the Benefit of man-kind, the end.  And on the contrary, Metaphors, and senselesse and 
ambiguous words, are like ignes fatui (will-o’-the wisp); and reasoning upon them, is 
wandering amongst innumerable absurdities; and their end, contention, and sedition, or 
contempt. 1 
 
Hobbes’s clarity is appealing, although he seems to demand a lot from the irremediably inexact 
social sciences.   Nonetheless, the discipline of politics includes many who believe that something 
like a Hobbesian programme of definition ‘first snuffed and purged from ambiguity’  followed by 
‘science’ is possible.  This is certainly the case for many who write on political corruption, and while 
that strategy has some things in its favour, it also has pitfalls.  The last thirty years of writing on 
political corruption and its definition provide eloquent testimony to both. 
 
A definition can have two dimensions: it may articulate the meaning and use of a word, and it can 
provide a tool in the construction of an explanation.  The linguistic and cultural turns in philosophy, 
history and anthropology have made many scholars more interested in the former; while the social 
sciences have focussed more on the latter.  Both programmes are defensible, but neither should be 
conducted in ignorance of the other, as Hobbes was aware.2 
 
Understood as a tool, a definition aims to identify a set of criteria that serve as necessary and 
sufficient conditions in picking out a distinct phenomenon or class of phenomena.   That 
phenomenon (or class), once distinguished, can be understood or explained by reference to sets of 
antecedents or causal conditions.  If we conflate the definitions with the causal conditions we get 
tautologies.  For example, we cannot explain the fact that increasing numbers of young men are 
failing to marry by saying that they are bachelors!   Nor do we explain the fact that people are using 
their offices to generate income for themselves by saying that they are corrupt.  That may be a re-
description of the state of affairs but it is not an explanation.   Explanations are in something of a 
state of tension with definitions.  Ideally, one’s class of events (picked out by a definition) is a class 
that also has some explanatory unity, in the sense that members of the class are susceptible of the 
same causal explanations.  Yet, we do not want to identify the class by the fact that the same 
explanation works, since we need to pick out the criteria that unite the class independently from the 
conditions that explain its occurrence.  
 
Consider, for example,  ‘economic’ definitions of corruption that use ‘principal-agent theory’ –  that 
is, economic theory that looks at ways of designing incentives to induce agents to act in ways that 
are optimal for those employing or directing them (their principals), when the agent’s behaviour 
cannot be directly observed.  On these accounts, corruption is defined  ‘in terms of the divergence 
between the principal’s or the public’s interest and those of the agent or civil servant: corruption 
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occurs when an agent betrays the principal’s interests in pursuit of her own.’ 3 Here the definition – 
it is a case of corruption when the agent ‘betrays’ the principal in pursuit of her own interests – is 
quickly tied into an account in which the focus is on the conditions under which it is possible for the 
agent to pursue her own interests with impunity.  Such conditions usually entail a monopoly of 
certain goods, discretion in their distribution, and a lack of accountability.   But these causal 
conditions risk being too closely linked to the definition, in virtue of the background assumptions 
about agent motivation.  If we assume that people act self-interestedly, and think of politics as a 
realm in which the interests of those holding public office are potentially divergent from the 
interests of the public at large, then we produce an explanation of corrupt behaviour by reference to 
the conditions under which self-interest can be pursued by public office holders with impunity.   
Probity in public office, then, is explained by the absence of monopoly and discretion and the 
existence of high levels of accountability – that is, we get probity when the principal-agent problem 
is diminished to zero, since behaviour is rendered observable!  Moreover, the definition includes the 
term ‘betrayal, but remains silent on the range of issues concerning what counts as a ‘betrayal’.  
What counts as a betrayal must depend on the relative rights and responsibilities of principal and 
agent and must refer to norms concerning their respective roles and responsibilities.  Corruption is, 
then, is derogation from these norms, but it is not just any derogation.  Incompetence is not the 
same as corruption. Nor are all derogations that involve the pursuit of self-interest corrupt, since 
some (such as treason on the one hand, or informal collective bargaining to raise wages on the 
other) should be distinguished from corruption.   What should be clear is that the definition now 
seems less convincing, since a huge amount depends on the structure of norms and expectations 
that frame the agent’s relationship to her principal, and frame the range of legitimate expectations 
the principal may have.  These elements must inform our definition of corruption, making it, 
inevitably, a more complex, and more local matter.  
 
Definitions carve up the world of objects and events in way that allow us to think more clearly and 
consistently about our world.  But, in many areas of the social sciences, they are not picking out 
discrete natural objects, so much as types or ranges of behaviour.  And, in defining behaviour as 
corrupt, we define it not solely in terms of an external description of bodily movements, but as a 
motivated social action.  That means that we are distinguishing types of agent motivation, and thus 
differences in the meaning associated with the act by the agent, and are acknowledging that the 
categories of meaning with which men and women engage are not solipsistic in character, but are 
linked to the broader social world in which they participate.   
 
Moreover, corruption is category term of appraisal:  in calling something corrupt we attach negative 
connotations to it - or, at the very least, we report it in terms to which those involved would attach 
negative connotations.  Because it is a widely used category of social meaning with powerful 
negative connotations, more specialised, technical and professional use of the term often clashes 
with the meanings which are ascribed to it by ordinary people, politicians and public servants, the 
media and commentators, each of whom may have different concerns, and different interests in 
identifying certain types of conduct as corrupt.  And, least we think that our scholarly position 
guarantees our objectivity, a vast quantity of the now voluminous literature on corruption is clearly 
and deeply marked by a set of Western assumptions about the need for free markets and liberal 
constitutional orders, coupled with a suspicion of political power and the state.  Indeed, the thrust of 
most literature emanating from economics and drawing on rent-seeking and principal-agent models, 
is close to suggesting that politics is inevitably a force for corruption. 
 
This does not mean that we cannot reach any degree of objectivity in definition, although doing so is 
a lot more difficult than the literature generally assumes.  The great majority of those writing about 
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corruption deal with the definition of corruption rather dismissively, suggesting that, while there are 
issues about definition these tend to muddy the water to no real purpose, and they take  this as 
sufficient warrant to adopt a one-line definition, usually following the model of bribery, which they 
then apply to the argument in hand – being helped along by metrics such as the Corruption 
Perception Index, which rely heavily on perceptions of bribery.  Stipulating in this way rides rough 
shod over social meanings.  But, if we argue that corruption is an entirely local phenomenon - wholly 
defined by local norms, mores and cultural values -then we abandon the idea of family resemblances 
that would allow us to see it as an instance of a more general cross-cultural category. The 
definitional problem of political corruption then is bounded by the unappealing options of relativism 
(in which local definitions are treated as untranslatable to other contexts) or stipulation (in which we 
insist on a technical definition).   With a strong behavioural turn in political science and its the 
emphasis on quantitative analysis it is not surprising that scholars tend to opt for the latter, or follow 
others who do so! 4   
 
Certainly,  acknowledging definitional complexities introduces problems in analysis and tends to 
render rather meaningless a number of pieces of work that treat the term as effortlessly capturing 
the same phenomenon across vastly differing cultures.  But the fact that work must be done on a 
conceptual tool for it to work in different contexts should be accepted as part of the price for a 
political science that is sensitive to differences in social and cultural systems, meanings and values.  
Does this approach take us away from Hobbes’s injunction?  Not at all.  Hobbes was a nominalist: 
what he sought to do was to put together a clearly defined lexicon that could render the political 
world coherent and orderly for people in virtue of it being itself, orderly and coherent.  If people 
understood terms in very different ways there could be no order. This meant that  definitions had to 
mesh with people’s more inchoate understandings, serving to systematize these into a coherent 
world view.  That, for Hobbes, was a central objective of his science. In a similar spirit, this chapter 
explores the difficulties of definition in the field of political corruption and argues for a deeper 
conceptual understanding that identifies the place which the problem of political corruption 
occupies within western political thinking.  With Hobbes, it argues that getting the terminology right 
is also a way of both understanding and ordering the political world.   
 
 
II 
 
Corruption in the West has a very particular history, tied to a conception of the decay and 
decomposition of a thing. As the OED defines it:  
The destruction or spoiling of anything, esp. by disintegration or by decomposition with its 
attendant unwholesomeness; and loathsomeness; putrefaction 
Or, in a more general sense:  
Destruction, dissolution of the constitution which makes a thing what it is. 
 
In this essay I am concerned more generally with political corruption, that is, with the decay or 
destruction of the political (although the term may also be applied elsewhere – as in economic 
corruption).  This Western understanding of political corruption, then, presupposes an 
understanding of the character of politics and the political order, which is why it is not surprising 
that the most extensive analysis of political corruption is given in classical and republican texts in 
which there is a sense of the unity and cohesiveness of the political order being harmed or 
destroyed by malign influences.   That sense of a political order as involving a shared political 
culture, with public offices being directed to securing the public interest or the public good, plays a 
major part in ancient Greek and Roman thinking, and goes on to be profoundly influential on 
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Machiavelli’s republicanism and on the languages of political theory in early modern Europe that J. 
G. A. Pocock and others have traced through Britain and America.5   
 
We inherit from this tradition a sense that politics can work: that is, that there can be ways of 
resolving differences that do not involve simply the domination of one group by another or the 
design of institutions and rules to facilitate that domination.  The Western conception of political 
corruption, in so far as it is an intelligible and coherent one, derives its meaning in large part from 
the sense that political order has (at least potentially) a certain function and character and that this 
is suborned and subverted when interests turn the political system to their own ends.  We can 
disagree about what politics requires and about what supports or harms it.  But, in the West, we 
have this concept because we think that politics can be prevented from working as it should, with 
damaging long-term consequences, when people use their power for their own ends, or where the 
exercise of public office is subverted by forces that lack legitimate standing within the political 
system.   Moreover, while the technical discussion of corruption is often very precise and may seem 
unconnected with this tradition, there is also a public discourse in which corruption is used by 
people to describe their sense that political power is being subverted by sectional forces.  This 
tension between technical and popular understandings can give rise to confusion for which there is 
no simple solution.  
 
Technical definitions are also dogged by the clear normative connotations that are intrinsic to the 
term ‘corruption.’   At the same time, popular understandings, while they express this normative 
element,  are often imprecise and highly emotive and may attribute to corruption a range of failings 
in the political or economic system that are not in any clear sense corrupt. At the same time,  the 
absence of popular concern certainly cannot be taken as indicating the absence of corruption.  One 
middle route between highly technical definitions and relying on popular understandings has been 
to appeal to the intrinsic character of a particular political system as a basis for identifying corrupt 
deviations.  Dennis Thompson, for example, in his work on ‘mediated corruption,’6 partly appeals to 
shared norms, but also to the character of the democratic system.  The difficulty with this route is in 
justifying the norms that are taken to be integral to the type of political system. (In an appeal to 
standards of democracy should we think of this as reflecting norms of democracy tout court, or of 
democracy in the United States, or, more broadly, of constitutional democracies or representative 
political systems?).  
 
On the account I am proposing, corruption arises within a set of largely western assumptions about 
politics and its character.7   This encourages us to extend the focus of concerns about cultural 
differences and the importance of local understandings from a concentration on what behaviour 
people classify as corrupt, to identify the framework in which they make these judgments.  That is,  
by grasping how they understand the political system and its operation, and how far they have a 
sense of the political as a sphere in which conflicts could be resolved in ways that can be widely 
legitimated.  The challenge for political scientists, from this perspective, is to recognise the diversity 
of political orders and the various judgments that are made about the forces that threaten the 
stability and legitimacy of these orders.  Exactly what counts as corruption may be relative, but our 
understanding of it is rooted in a conception of politics that sees it as a distinct sphere of allocation 
and exchange, and as one that can be subverted in ways that attack its basic ‘nature’ or function, 
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and that we call corrupt. The underlying conception of politics is often deeply contested, and its 
precise character and scope will vary across different contexts, but people’s concerns with 
corruption are predicated upon it.  People’s conception of politics can be flawed: by seeing politics 
as appropriate where other systems of rules or norms – social, familial, religious –provide a basis for 
distribution and exchange and are able to command a sufficient consensus, which politics may de-
stabilize or damage; or by failing to recognise the contradictions in their conception – as when they 
expect both direct accountability to popular pressure and procedural fairness.   But, while 
conceptions can be flawed and contested, it is the underlying conception of politics that is at stake, 
and that is something that is not infinitely varied – there are feasibility constraints, and limits on 
what conceptions can provide sufficient normative content to fuel judgments of corruption, both of 
which give some objective and cognitive character to the debate.   And, while some cultures do not 
have an understanding that delineates politics from other realms  (such as religion) or which 
subordinates politics to those realms, we  can understand the growing universality of the language 
of political corruption as symptomatic of the way that Western states and global capitalism have 
drawn a wide range of different social and political orders into a system of power and exchange that 
has increasingly necessitated the development of domestic political institutions that the West can 
recognise and endorse, in part by their sharing (or seeming to share) in its understanding of the 
character of politics.   
 
When we define political corruption, then, we do so with a sense that politics has some  structure 
and order (if only potentially) that is being subverted by people who fail to conform to the norms 
and expectations of that structure in their societies, and do so in pursuit of advantage for 
themselves or their groups or factions.  People can fundamentally oppose the political order without 
being corrupt (as with revolutionaries), but their behaviour counts as political action (rather than 
corruption), because they project another order and different criteria of legitimacy, and because 
their end is not simply their own gain but the establishment of an alternative political system.8   As 
political theorists and political scientists, our vocation is centrally concerned with identifying the 
conditions for the emergence and continuance of stable, legitimate orders, that command authority, 
and that are able to resist subversion for personal or sectional ends either by those entrusted with 
power and responsibility or by internal social forces or external powers.  But we should recognise 
that what this will look like is likely to be heavily dependent on local causal conditions and existing 
cultural commitments and norms.   
 
 
 
III 
 
It should now be clear that we will not find a one-line definition of corruption.9 If we adopt 
something like ‘the misuse of public office for private gain’ we may find the conditions to be present 
without corruption being the appropriate term, as the case of treason shows.  Equally, we might fall 
short of one of the conditions and yet still want to use the term corruption: when a politician sticks 
to the rules but devotes his office to maximising his income; where  a public official’s distribution of 
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contracts responds to a mix of threats and offers (what Nozick calls ‘throffers’10), so that he has little 
choice in what he does; or where the gain is to one’s party or constituency, rather than personal, but 
where rules or norms are broken or subverted.11 We need then to identify the major elements of 
political corruption, which can then be combined into a rough definition – one that sketches a core 
conception while acknowledging that cases without all the core features may nonetheless count as 
corruption.  
 
The key elements of a definition of political corruption are: 
 A conception of public office with rules and norms for the conduct of that office, where the 
office is defined partly in terms of a broader public interest that it serves, and where these 
interests may conflict with the personal or partisan interests of the office-holder. 
 A view that corruption involves the distortion or subversion of the exercise of public office 
so that it meets private, partisan or sectional rather than public interests - so that some 
people gain who should not and some lose (or fail to benefit) who should not. 
 The idea that three actors are normally involved in or affected by corrupt activity: the 
occupant of the public office (A), the intended beneficiary of that office (B); and the actual 
(i.e., newly intended) beneficiary of the particular exercise of that office (C).12 This triadic 
relation does not always hold (in a kleptocracy, for example, A and C are the same; whereas, 
with administrative payments, B and C may be identical, although A also gains) but the 
identification of three distinct roles encourages us to distinguish common theft or fraud 
from corruption, and helps capture how corruption distorts the exercise of public office and 
power. 
 
Combining these elements we can arrive at a suitably tentative definition: 
Corruption in politics occurs where a public official (A), violates the rules and/or norms of 
office, to the detriment of the interests of the public (B)13 (or some sub-section thereof) who 
is the designated beneficiary of that office, to benefit themselves and a third party (C) who 
rewards or otherwise incentivises A to gain access to goods or services they would not 
otherwise obtain.14  
 
Note, the definition does not assume that A’s behaviour must break the law. Legal definitions of 
corruption can fail to capture some of the worst cases of corrupt activity because corrupt 
transactions can be institutionalised in the laws of the state or economy - as recognised in work by 
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 Robert Nozick, ‘Coercion’ in P. Laslett,, W. G. Runciman, and Q. Skinner, eds., Philosophy, Politics 
and Society, Fourth Series (Oxford, Blackwell, 1972). 
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contested a concept as corruption and is thus perhaps not a good alternative!  
7 
 
the World Bank on ‘state capture’ – that is, where corrupt relations are used to pass laws that 
entrench, extend, and render ‘legitimate’ corrupt gains.15  
 
Although I have emphasised ‘political’ corruption, it is clear that the term can also be applied in 
other domains.  We can talk of economic corruption, or corruption in a range of public services, such 
as health or education. But all corruption has the same conceptual structure: firstly, a recognition of 
certain formal responsibilities attached to an idea of office or a position of trust, which imply certain 
responsibilities and constraints on certain types of self-interested behaviour; secondly, the violation 
of rules and norms concerning the exercise of that office or trust, with thirdly,   the (intended) 
harming of one set of interests identified by the rules and norms as legitimate, to serve others 
deemed illegitimate; and fourthly, the benefitting of those not formally entitled to benefit and, 
thereby, the subversion of the legitimated ends of the office.  
 
 
IV 
 
One area in which there has been disagreement about how to characterize a corrupt act concerns 
the issue of non-triadic relationships.   In the definition given above there are three types of agent – 
those in public office (A); those who are the intended beneficiaries of those offices (B); and those 
who are the actual beneficiaries (C).   In some cases, however, we want to identify agents as corrupt 
when they use their office to expropriate wealth directly from the state for their own benefit.  A 
public official who takes money from the office safe is not engaged in a triadic relationship – his 
actions do cause harms, and may mean that some individuals entitled to a benefit do not receive it, 
but this is not done in a way that benefits a third party.  People’s intuitions here vary.   It seems clear 
that a kleptocrat ruler is corrupt, because he systematically distorts the exercise of power to his own 
benefit.   I am less persuaded that the office clerk who steals postage stamps is corrupt.  Those who 
want to equate the cases show exemplary consistency in criteria – A is clearly abusing his public 
office to serve his private interests.  But they omit the political context of the action.  The clerk is 
engaged in theft – he is stealing from his employer, he is not, in most cases, distorting the way in 
which power and authority is exercised.   If we take an understanding of corruption that tries to 
think hard about the political order and its subversion, then the kleptocrat’s case looks very different 
from the clerk’s, even if their actions can fall under the same description.  Pressing the political 
interpretation is complex, because we have to have some sense, in highly corrupt states, of what is 
actually possible, but it also has the advantage of not over-generalising, and not proliferating cases 
of corruption.  Moreover, accusing people of theft is both simpler and better understood in the 
public domain, and it avoids tainting the system with the more general claim that it is corrupt.  It 
may lack adequate regulation, it may create incentives and opportunities for people to steal, but in 
itself this does not make it politically corrupt.   
 
That said, the cases lie on a continuum and it has to be a matter for argument and judgment as to 
what type or scale of thefts is sufficient to count as politically distorting.  One possibility is that, 
beyond a certain point, those involved need the collusion of others, and to secure that the illicit 
‘redistributive’ process begins to develop implications for how far a wider range of people are 
fulfilling their roles.  Moreover, these additional beneficiaries do now provide us with the third 
triadic point (C ).  
 
The misuse of public office for private gain is too blunt an instrument to serve as a definition of 
corruption.  President Clinton’s philandering looks like it meets that definition, but it is conceptually 
incontinent to think that the philandering is itself a case of political corruption.   On the other hand, 
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a political system that systematically allowed its President or government ministers  to impose their 
sexual demands on young women (as in Mario Vargas Llosa’s depiction of the Dominican Republic 
under Trujillo)16 looks more plausibly corrupt because it does turn political power into a source of 
access to goods and resources that are not formally and legitimately in its domain, leading to cover-
ups, conspiracies against the public interest, the use of coercion, fear  and brutality, and distorting 
the character of political power.  
 
The cases of kleptocracy and of self-serving dictatorships more generally are usually cases of A-led 
corruption.  The state begins as a body of armed men, they recognise the virtues of being stationary 
rather than roving bandits (to follow Olson’s distinction17) but, while they court some legitimacy, 
they court only what they judge necessary to keep their hold on power and to allow them to 
maintain their expropriation.  They are primarily systems of domination and exploitation, they have 
a very limited arena of politics, and their authority is often heavily buttressed by coercion, 
intimidation, and ideology.  In making the rules, they can sometimes ensure that they do not need to 
break them.  But, while this leaves them clean on many definitions of corruption, the public domain 
is corrupt because it involves the distortion or subversion of the exercise of public office so as to 
meet private, partisan or sectional rather than properly public interests.   This is inevitably a partly 
normative claim – it assumes that there is something like a telos to the idea of a public domain or 
the public interest and that no amount of legislation can define away the content of the public 
interest to eliminate its status as a standard (which is not to say that its definition is easy or 
uncontentious).   This underlines the fact that corruption is a partly normative concept and that 
when its underlying sense of a deviation from a ‘natural’ or ethical standard of politics is eliminated 
then the term loses its moral and cognitive compass. 
 
Applying the term is not, however, equally easy in all contexts.  In a state with a structured and well-
regulated public domain, with high levels of transparency and an active and open public culture, not 
only is the detection of corrupt activity easier, so too is its identification as ‘corrupt’, because we can 
see that the agent is using his office in ways that violate clear standards for that office, and because 
we can identify individual gain.   But this is a great deal more difficult where the political order is 
more fractured and chaotic.   
 
While the self-interested violation of norms and rules of public office looks like at least a necessary 
condition for corruption (not sufficient because of the case of straight theft), in war-torn states, 
transitional regimes, or a variety of other contexts in which the rules and expectations of public 
office are not clearly articulated and laid down, it may be unclear how to characterise the agent’s 
actions.  This is because we are not sure what to say in cases where people have  no realistic options 
but to act as they do and because it seems odd to characterize their behaviour in terms that assume 
that it is self-serving.   We may here be talking about the victims of corrupt states, or of cases where 
disorder is so rampant that no norms concerning public office and the allocation of resources are 
operative.  In these cases, behaviour may not be wholly a function of necessity, or self interest, but 
may involve family duties, ethnic or religious loyalties, fidelity to friends, norms of reciprocity, 
machismo values of risk taking, and so on, each of which may displace the norms of public office for 
some individuals or groups of individuals.  Where international agencies or central institutions 
attempt to establish norms that demand different behaviour than those of the group, these 
activities will seem corrupt, even though it is not clear what alternative behaviour is open to people.   
In some cases (as with family-based mafia organisations) we are dealing with mutually exclusive 
normative systems, but in others we often face powerful normative systems that are more benign  
but are still partly in conflict with the norms of the political system.  Above all, we need to grasp 
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what is motivating people if we are to change the way they behave or adjust the demands we make 
of them.   
 
What we cannot do is to assume that self-interest lies at the base of every action. Economic models 
of corruption mostly assume that the way to reduce corruption is to reduce the incentives to break 
rules, either by increasing the costs of being caught, or by increasing the cost of the activity itself 
(either making it more difficult or reducing the opportunities for it).  But seeing things in cost-benefit 
terms, assumes that the agent's orientation towards rules and norms is such that they are to be 
followed or broken in accordance with a calculation of rational self-interest.  This characterisation 
runs up against the issue of what it is to follow a rule.  If rules have no salience for the individual 
except where following them maximises self-interest, then the character of a rule is not being 
recognised. If we think all other agents have a wholly opportunistic attitude to the rules of a game, 
then the game falls apart (much as if we were to assume that when people speak they only ever say 
what they think will work to their maximal advantage in a given situation – that assumption would 
destroy the conditions for conversation, collaboration or friendship).  For it to be a rule for an agent 
it needs to be recognised as a prima facie guide to conduct and/or as a way of initially framing a 
context.  That a rule may subsequently be violated to maximise self-interest does not mean that we 
should understand compliance, where it happens, as also self-interest maximising.  Given the 
chance, we might decide to cheat at chess, but to weigh compliance with every rule by the test of 
expedience would be to make the game itself unintelligible.  Corrupt players, for the most part want 
to cheat within a framework that identifies goals, means and opportunities. To repudiate the 
framework entirely is not to play that game. This means that the issue cannot be wholly reduced to 
providing the right incentive structures for people's interests.  Indeed, it is a wildly ambitious to try 
to establish a system of cross-checking interests that can ensure that both the principal actors and 
those responsible for rewarding or penalising their behaviour act to sustain the political order while 
also acting maximally in their own interests. It is more useful to think in terms of how to frame 
people’s relationship to the political system so that they share (some of) its norms and values, rather 
than having their aspirations and expectations framed by wholly non-political expectations – 
whether economic or cultural.   This is why those who are trapped in situations where there is no 
clear sense of what the rules are or what the game is, are not best understood as corrupt.  And it is 
that insight that underlines the sense that it is only by having politics (to a reasonably structured 
extent) that one can have political corruption. 
 
A further dimension of the definition is that it should alert us to potentially very different types of 
corrupt activity. Thus far, the examples used have tended to focus on those in public office, treating 
them as the key agents in corruption, but there are different types of action and those holding office 
in some capacity can be differentially predatory (we might appeal to the Knapp Commission’s 
distinction between grass eaters and meat eaters18), but the triadic definition also points to the 
potential importance of the other agents (or groups of agents) involved.   A can play a variety of 
roles, from predator, to accomplice, to victim, and corruption can be very much C-led, rather than 
initiated by public officials.   In predatory mode, A may initiate the corrupt exchange and actively 
seek out opportunities for such exchanges. A is an accomplice if he is responding to initiatives in 
their mutual interest from C, who is either outside or in another part of the political system.  A is a 
victim when he is subordinate to the demands of others, by blackmail, intimidation, or coercion.  
Political systems can be corrupt from the head – hence the anti-corruption mantra ‘the fish rots 
from the head’; but they can also be corrupt from the body – that is, that societal group and forces 
may be such as to undermine the autonomy of the political process and suborn or intimidate those 
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in public office.    These distinctions can help us to recognise certain types or, as Michael Johnston 
has termed them, syndromes.19  A-led corruption can be recognised in the case of official moguls; 
influence markets and elite cartels are predominantly reciprocal systems, and C-led corruption is 
common where oligarchs and clans, with bases outside the political system, are able to control and 
dominate greater or smaller parts of that system.    Johnston’s categories are ideal types (although 
that cannot be quite the right term!) and given cases might need further analysis, pressing the 
question of how some get others to do things they would not otherwise do, what the basis for that 
capacity is and how far it is distinct from, linked to, or rooted in the formal political system, as well 
as how far there are any clear lines between political institutions and other social and economic 
structures.   But they have the great virtue of taking seriously both the variety of forms of 
corruption, and the very different problems faced by strong and weak states.   
 
While definitions and studies of corruption tend to focus either on predatory public officials or 
powerful extra political interests that subvert the political process, relatively little attention is given 
to those who lose out by their activities – namely B in the triadic relationship.  One reason is that the 
claim that they necessarily lose out can be challenged.   In states which are locked up in red tape, it 
is possible that corrupt activity can promote economic activity that benefits all; where corruption 
plays a part in a rationing system for scarce resources, and where influence is exerted through 
patrimonial systems, rather than financial incentives, formally corrupt systems may produce more 
rational allocations than the available alternatives.   More generally there is always an issue of 
whether a group, B, is worse off than it would be, not if it received its due, but if it received what 
could be secured to it from the feasible set of possibilities in a given situation.    
 
The case of B is simple where there are clear distributional principles and entitlements that are 
widely legitimated and a political system that complies with these  relatively systematically. Things 
become more complex the more fragile the order. They become more complex in part because the 
roles of A, B, and C, lose some of their distinctness: public office, its boundaries and responsibilities 
are less sharply delineated; and lines between B and C may also become indistinct.  Thus, in post-
conflict areas everyone may be engaged in a struggle to secure resources in what is effectively a 
zero-sum game.   Even in more structured and ordered contexts, although we can enhance B’s 
power in various ways to reduce their risk of losing out, or to increase their ability to hold public 
office holders to account, we also have to recognise that political systems also need to educate their 
expectations.  Popular senses of exploitation or disadvantage often have recourse to the normative 
and emotive language of corruption to classify problems that are in fact a function of a range of 
other problems. And this can serve further to destabilize political systems.   In many respects this 
parallels the concern underlying  Hobbes‘s obsession with definition.  We need a clearly defined 
lexicon, but we also need to ensure that that language both reflects and orders in various ways the 
understandings of those who act in politics, lest conflicting understandings generate or reinforce 
conflicting interests that threaten the integrity of the political domain.   To be united under the 
sovereign is partly to accept and share a common political language and its accompanying 
expectations. 
 
Assessment of the dynamics of the interactions between these three elements, A, B, and C, is central 
to grasping the precise nature of the activity involved. But attention also needs to be directed to the 
site and the character of the corruption:  Does the activity aim at the electoral process and the filling 
of public office, at controlling policy within the political process or decisions within the 
administration (including the allocations of burdens, such as taxes and rates, or benefits, such as 
licences or contracts), or at eliding the formal controls on public officials and members of the 
political élite? How securely is the political system legitimated, and how far is its activity undermined 
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by non-compliance among the wider population?  And what impact does this have on the way the 
state acts, and especially on its ability to retain its capacity to rule and on its relations with 
enforcement agencies within the state, such as the police and army. The precise form and context of 
corruption will affect assessments of what remedies might be appropriate. In choosing between 
norms, incentives, penalties, scrutiny systems and demands for transparency or tolerance, one must 
fit the medicine to the patient.  
 
The more that corrupt activity flows from individual incentives unattached to group norms and a 
broader motivational frame, the easier it is to deal with.  Any political system has a few bad eggs, 
every system needs checks and audits, and public officials need to be clear when contacts with the 
public over-step acceptable bounds.  But if we are dealing with isolated cases, the costs are likely to 
be less extensive and detection and prosecution easier.  In contrast, the more embedded corrupt 
activity is within a society's broader social or cultural mores the more difficult it is to deal with - 
because there will be more things to change, more reflexive and organised resistance to such 
change, less legitimacy attaching to those who promote the changes, and considerable collective 
action problems (such as who is to change first!).  Where holders of public office share these extra-
political mores, it becomes increasingly difficult to say that corruption is A-led or C-led, since there 
can be a very high degree of collusion between the actors, and a sense that what they do is 
legitimate.  The more widespread this sense is, the more difficult it is to identify any institution or 
office in the political system that could authoritatively signal that the activity is unacceptable.  
 
 
V 
 
Understanding issues relating to the definition of political corruption in the way I have suggested 
should alert us to the fact that our Western language of corruption is unlikely to map without 
difficulty onto all local understandings.   For example, corruption, as Western political scientists use 
it, is a largely technical term that may part company, sometimes dramatically, with the broad public 
use of the term to express dissatisfaction with their government.  That is a reason to be careful 
about its local use, and to avoid broad-brush anti-corruption campaigns, which, as Ivan Krastev has 
argued, are likely to trigger unrealistic expectations.20  Indeed, in many states a good deal of work 
needs to be done to help to articulate a conception of politics and of the role of the state that can 
command widespread legitimacy and form the basis of people’s expectations of their political and 
administrative systems.  On that ground, the World Bank’s shift in concern away from corruption to 
governance indicators is to be commended (even if the contestability of these indicators tends to be 
under-estimated). Scattering the landscape with anti-corruption slogans establishes negative 
attitudes, but often does little to contribute to positive expectations and the emergence of a shared 
lexicon of political evaluation.  
 
I have argued that careful thinking about the respective roles of the three agents identified in the 
definition of corruption can help us recognise a wide range of different corrupt practices, with 
corresponding implications for the way in which we respond to corruption.  I have not in any sense 
sought to be exhaustive in my analysis but I have tried to make a case that a  fine-grained analysis of 
the exact form that corrupt relations take in any given state is necessary if we are to think 
constructively about how we might explain and address the problem.   To do this we do not need a 
single-line definition, but a grasp of the conceptual commitments within which it makes sense to talk 
of corruption, and within which we can develop finer grained distinctions that isolate different types 
of corrupt relationship. And we need to reflect on the plausibility and relevance of those 
commitments to that particular context and to the norms and expectations that people have.  In 
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turn, this will allow us to think through directed strategies to tackle particular problems, in particular 
contexts.   In my view, this kind of activity is very much in keeping with Hobbes’s concern, ‘by exact 
definitions first snuffed and purged from ambiguity to secure the increase of science and the benefit 
of man-kind.’ It is just a lot more difficult than it is often taken to be and it demands a very acute 
awareness that the terms we use come from a particular way of seeing the world that others do not 
automatically share and that a world in which people do not share understandings of corruption will 
inevitably be a disordered one. Moreover, with Hobbes, the underlying point of such an account of 
the definition of corruption is to develop a lexicon that, in given national contexts, can secure 
legitimacy, and thereby consensus and political order, as against ‘contention, and sedition, or 
contempt.’ 
